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FRANCESCO FORTE
UNIVERSITY OF TURIN
I. POSTWAR ECONOMIC GROWTH
The postwar economic growth of Italy has been remarkable com-
pared with that of other industrialized countries, as well as with
that of most previous periods in Italian economic history. Between
1951 and 1962, Italy's national income increased at a rate of about 6
per cent per annum in current lire, and the country's growth rate
both in real and in per capita terms was almost as high. Prices were
relatively stable through 1961; wholesale prices did not change,
while retail prices rose only moderately. Population rose by only 6.5
per cent from 1951 to 1961, mainly as a result of a continuous re-
duction in the mortality rate, owing to better sanitary conditions,
to social assistance, and to an improved standard of living.
This high and steady growth rate combined with reasonably sta-
ble prices may suggest that the growth process has been essentially
sound and that it has been supported by a good tax system and fa-
vorable tax policies. This is not so. It is our thesis that the Italian
tax system has not been, and still is not, favorable to economic
growth. Past growth has occurred not because but in spite of the
tax system. Continued growth may well require tax reforms.
After 1961 the growth process began to falter. The beginning of
inflation was followed by wage increases that exceeded increases in
productivity. The subsequent balance-of-payments crisis in 1963 was
ameliorated only at the cost of sharp deflationary measures that re-
sulted in industrial production marking time in the last quarter of
1963 and even slightly falling in the first quarter of 1964. It seemed
that the postwar "Italian miracle" was faced with some very real
problems, of which tax policy and reform were of considerable im-
portance.
Nom: For conversion purposes, 1 tira =0.16U.S. cents, or 625 L $1.—
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Structural Features of the Italian Growth Process
What have been some of the key features of the Italian growth
process? If the tax structure has been a drag on economic growth,
what distinctive forces made the remarkable growth in the 1950's
possible?
First, this growth process has been fed continuously by the in-
crease in the labor force. While population increased by only about
0.5 per cent per year, employment increased by nearly 2 per cent
per year. Employment has been fed from two sources: absorption of
the unemployed and the movement of disguised unemployment
from agriculture to industry, primarily from the south to the in-
dustrial north. Thus, until 1960, the increase in total wages paid
was the result of higher employment, not of higher wage rates. This
increase in total wages, therefore, did not put pressure on costs; in
fact, productivity rose much faster than labor unit costs. However,
the increase in employment and purchasing power throughout the
economy did provide buoyant demand conditions.
As the Italian economy approaches a position of full employment
—or at least one of full employment for those persons who are capa-
ble of being gainfully employed—the possibility of further "exten-
sive" increases in employment have been reduced. Certain indus-
tries, such as construction and agriculture, have begun to turn to
more capital-intensive methods of increasing output, although they
have had no preparation for this. Moreover, it is now becoming evi-
dent that it is mainly through rising per capita wages that an ex-
pansion of total demand can be continued. But such wage increases
create problems of business costs and therefore of price stability. Al-
though, up to now, increases in productivity have preceded in-
creases in per capita wages by several years, Italy is currently con-
fronted by the possibility of having to choose between a continued
high growth rate and stable prices.
In recent years, wage increases have tended to exceed productivity
increases in some sectors of the economy. Increases in productivity
have varied among the agricultural, industrial, and tertiary sectors.
Before the war the agricultural sector was the principal contributor
to Italian economic development, but during the fifties industry—-.-•y ——.—-, . y-..•W .Wrpfl.w-.'rr.fl,w—.'flT'r.—v
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TABLE1
Value Added in Private Sector, 195 1—62
(billion 1960 lire)
Tertiary
Agriculture Industry Sector Total
1951 2,167 3,458 1,948 7,573
1952 2,315 3,825 2,302 8,442
1953 2,646 4,186 2,498 9,330
1954 2,658 4,573 2,717 9,948
1955 2,786 5,007 2,950 10,743
1956 2,658 5,288 3,223 11,169
1957 2,729 5,687 3,492 11,908
1958 2,949 6,128 3,830 12,907
1959 3,121 6,853 4,638 13,612 •
1960 2,993 7,634 5,133 15,760
1961 3,390 8,456 .,589 17,435
1962 3,544 9,266 6,120 18,930
played the dominant role. The tertiary sector also developed rapid-
ly during this period, but here the productivity gains were some-
what questionable, especially in distribution and public administra-
tion.
Italian growth has also had an uneven geographic impact. The
industrial development of the past twelve years has been concen-
trated mainly in the so-called Milan-Turin-Genoa triangle and in
some of the surrounding regions, such as Veneto and Emilia, while
it has been modest in other sections. This concentration, and the
fact that agriculture has not been expanding as fast as industry, has
resulted in regional as well as sectoral unbalance. Attempts have
been made to correct the former by the policy of granting aids for
the economic development of the Mezzogiorno in a broad area
which also includes a part of central Italy. But the meagerness of
industrial development in the south casts some doubts concerning
the potency of the fiscal and monetary measures that were intended
to stimulate growth in these regions.
Table 1 gives value added in each of the three major segments of
the private sector from 1951 to 1962, and Table 2 the value added168 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE 2







1951 90 2,909 190 269 3,458
1952 110 3,090 227 398 3,825
1953 114 3,235 252 525 4,186
1954 132 3,492 319 630 4,573
1955 152 3,770 338 747 5,007
1956 176 3,948 351 813 5,288
1957 187 4,196 363 941 5,687
1958 180 4,507 391 1,050 6,128
1959 190 5,033 442 1,188 6,853
1960 195 5,668 495 1,276 7,634
1961 199 6,287 543 1,427 8,456
1962 196 6,822 586 1,664 9,266
in the four major industrial classes. The manufacturing industries
which led the Italian economic development in the 1950's were gen-
erally the "heavy" industries and those using advanced technology
such as steel, automobiles, chemicals, oils and engineering. Other
more labor intensive industries, such as textiles, tobacco, foods,
drinks and leather, and those processing agricultural products, have
had a smaller expansion.
A feature of Italian growth which explains the absence of any
marked rise in the general price level up to 1961 is the fact that
those industrial sectors where most of the economic growth was ex-
perienced were able to reduce their prices relative to those of the
less rapidly growing sectors. This can be seen in Table 3, which
shows the ratios between sectoral prices and general prices for agri-
culture and the four major industrial classes for the years 1951-61.
The great increase in productivity in the so-called "modern" in-
dustries was characterized by sharp increases in wages and profits
accompanied b.y a relative decline in prices. Jn these industries it
was possible for internal growth to be self-financing. At the same
time, the other sectors that were less well supplied with internalItaly 169
TABLE3
Ratio Between Sectoral and General Prices in Agriculture and








1951 100 100 100 100 100 100
1952 98.2991.2796.91 101.40 110.6497.59
1953 99.1279.0992.67 108.85 114.8794.69
1954 103.8078.5687.06 111.61 114.6690.52
1955 101.56 75.1785.44 118.34 113.56 89.81
1956 97.4465.8883.12 121.98 111.29 87.81
1957 100.14 62.55 82.46 125.26 110.80 87.55
1958 92.85 56.77 82.75 126.28 106.47 87.48
1959 92.25 55.3181.19 127.92 110.0886.58
1960 94.0853.07 79.33 130.19 108.4885.03
1961 95.1752.0879.35 131.38 106.5284.99
SouRcE: ILSES study of Regional Italian Economic Growth by F. Forte and
F.Indovina.
fundshad smaller possibilities of growth. Within these sectors there
were cases where, because of rising productivity, the possibilities of
profitable long-term investment were quite considerable.
Another feature of the Italian growth process during the years
1951-61 has been the fact that investment has risen at a faster rate
than consumption; higher profits and their use in self-financing
aided this development, but a high rate of public investment was
also a contributing factor. During the past two years, however, wage
increases have reduced the ability of Italy's expanding industries to
finance their growth from internal sources. Furthermore, rising
rents and retail prices have tended to push money wages even high-
er, so that these industries have had to face the necessity of doing
their financing in the open market. On the other hand, the ren tiers
who seem to have benefited most from capital gains in the recent
boom do not seem too anxious to employ their money in financing
industrial investments. The seriousness of this situation is only
partly mitigated by the presence of a larger number of public in-
dustrial enterprises which can secure funds through public financ-170 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
ing. These enterprises, like the private industries, do their financing
in the organized security markets.1
Italy's recent economic development has also been marked by a
great expansion in the demand for such consumer durable goods as
automobiles and domestic electric appliances. During the period
195 1-62, the number of cars in circulation is estimated to have in-
creased from 425,000 to over 3 million, or from one car for every
112 persons in the country to one for every 17. The consumption of
nondurable goods also increased greatly, with households spending
much more on higher-quality agricultural products, such as meat,
and on housing. The demand for more and better housing has been
particularly strong, partly because of rising incomes, but also as a
result of internal migrations from the south and from rural areas to
the industrial cities of the north. The progressive decontrol of
house rents has raised living costs, but has also encouraged housing
construction.
Italy has always had a balance-of-payments problem, but it has
recently become more acute as a result of the country's economic
development and rising income. Exports traditionally have been
smaller than imports. During the postwar years up to the beginning
of the 1950's, these difficulties were overcome mainly due to foreign
aid. Later on, the balance-of-payments problem was eased by several
favorable developments, including the discovery, in Italy, of large
reserves of natural gas, the recovery and considerable development
of foreign tourism, increased remittances from Italian emigrants to
Western European countries, and large foreign investments in Italy.
Even so, in 1954, when the ten-year Vanoni plan for growth and
employment was launched, the problem of the balance of payments
was considered to be one of the major issues of the immediate fu-
ture. This did not turn Out to be the case during the fifties, but
more recently the situation has worsened.
Among the factors which have contributed to the re-emergence of
a balance-of-payments problem, the following may be mentioned:
(1) emigrant remittances have slowed down their pace as more at-
Public enterprises are financed only to a minor extent with funds supplied
directly by taxation.— ..r .rw-I.rrr-w — -r fl-y
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tractive job opportunities and higher wages in Italy have made jobs
in other countries relatively less attractive; (2) a growing shortage
of labor for seasonal work and increasing congestion in the tradi-
tional tourist centers have placed limits on the further expansion of
tourism; (S) the attempt to enforce progressive income tax measures
has driven Italian capital abroad (especially to Switzerland); and (4)
imports of cars, of crude oil, and of certain food products have risen
sharply.
In summary, the principal weaknesses which underlie postwar
economic development may be restated as follows: agriculture has
been lagging too far behind industry; commercial distribution has
clung to traditional methods of operation characterized by disor-
ganization and low productivity; the great concentration of indus-
try in the north has intensified the demand for housing and public
services in the growing centers and left underutilized resources and
facilities in other areas; industrial development has had to be fi-
nanced internally in the absence of a parallel growth in the open
market for capital funds; consumer affluence has placed an increas-
ing strain on the balance of payments; and the emigration of capital
to avoid taxes on dividends has been difficult to control.
Underlying Determinants of Growth
The history of Italian economic growth poses some interesting
questions. For many countries the relevant question may be why
growth begins after decades or centuries of stagnation. For Italy it
seems more relevant to ask why growth did not occur before or con-
currently with that of the European countries to the north.
For centuries Italy was one of the most advanced countries of Eu-
rope, not only culturally but also in the financial, technical, and
commercial fields. Cities like 'Genoa, Milan, Florence, and Venice
were famous during the Renaissance for their economic and finan-
cial power. What happened? First, of course, there was a succession
of wars, bad government, and foreign domination that divided the
country. Later on, there was a slowness to adapt to the necessities of
a modern economy. National unification and a nationwide market
were slow in arriving. A feudal agricultural system persisted, and172 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
even today remains in some parts of the south. Good government,
especially at the local level, was slow to develop. Colonial wars and
two world wars drained state finances and increased the public debt.
The interlude with Fascism brought with it innumerable economic,
political, and social blunders. All these factors, and others, can be
pointed to in capsule form as drags on economic growth.
Why, then, could Italy so rapidly catch up in this postwar era?
Other underlying factors existed that made rapid growth possible
over the past decade. A great reservoir of unemployed and under-
employed labor existed. Technical skills were available; indeed, a
tradition of craftsmanship was a foundation for the development of
small and medium-sized industrial enterprises. Universities were
able to produce engineers and scientists at high levels of compe-
tence.
Other ingredients for growth were also present. The propensity
to save was high, both through habit and the sharp inequality in
income distribution. There was also easy access to the fast-growing
markets of Europe and North America after the war. Nearby finan-
cial centers, such as Zurich, were willing to finance profitable ven-
tures. Above all, Italy became more integrated within the broader
European economy. This also made available a vast pooi of tech-
nological knowledge.
Politically, nationalism and imperialism were replaced by con-
centration on increasing economic welfare. Italians became increas-
ingly willing to "act economically." Unions, local groups, and the
forces of self-government revived while feudalism and paternalism
wilted.
Even though Fascism had earlier maintained that Italy had a
"natural" condition of economic inferiority due to a meager re-
source base, this no longer seems to be true. As was stated, large nat-
ural-gasfields have been discovered.Italy's mountains provide
much hydroelectric power. The climate is ideal for many vegetables
and fruits. Italian history has filled the country with antiquities to
entice the tourist. Geography has made Italy a link between the
Middle East and Northern Europe and the United States. Since
many of these advantages had always existed, the question was es-
sentially one of putting them to use.
Financial and economic policies also played an important role.Italy
The credit and fiscal systems financed heavy public expenditures
without inflation. The tax system—despite its weaknesses and in-
equities—did raise important revenues. Unions were strong, but did
not push for excessive wage increases; of course, much of this is ex-
plained by the restraint of high unemployment.
Although the development of entrepreneurship was limited by a
ren tier group brought up in a paternalistic and feudal environ-
ment, a solution was found in creating large public enterprises in
steel, petrol, petrochemical, and other industries as well as in rele-
vant parts of the public utility and banking sectors. Entrepreneur-
ship (except in agriculture) a1so became more "socially acceptable,"
whereas previously the army and white collar work had been the
chief attractors of talent.
Unfortunately, agriculture has not participated fully in Italian
growth. Agrarian reform insisted on promoting the small family
farm. This might well have been the proper course fifty or one
hundred years ago in breaking the spell of feudalism, but today
such a policy absorbs great financial resources while hindering mod-
ernization and productivity increases. This lag in agriculture is be-
coming more keenly felt as growing food imports bear on the bal-
ance of payments. Finally, American aid was an important stimu-
lant in the postwar period. This was especially helpful in the liber-
alization of foreign exchange and trade.
II. TAX STRUCTURE
The Over-All Tax Burden
The over-all tax burden at all levels of government was consider-
able in Italy even before the Second World War, reaching nearly 20
per cent of national income in 1938. By 1952 it had regained this
level and by 1961 had risen to 24 per cent of national income (see
Table 4).
If social security contributions are added, this ratio rose to nearly
36 per cent in 1961. In relation to gross national products, the tax
burden is 31 per cent, with almost one-third of this being attribut-
able to the demands of the social security system.— —- - — --.—----.
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TABLE 4
National and Local Tax Revenues, 1938 and 1949—61
. Percentage of National
Revenue(million1960 lire) Income
National Local Total NationalLocalTotal
19381,158,830276,2601,435,090 16.03.8 19.8
19491,045,149 181,6481,226,797 15.02.6 17.6
19501,268,433 218,8651,487,298 15.52.7 18.2
19511,296,990 220,285 1,517,275 15.82.7 18.5
19521,548,151 262,1061,810,257 16.92.9 19.8







19603,521,376 526,162 4,047,538 20.5 3.1 23.5
19613,963,675 533,5454,497,220 21.02.823.8
This growth of revenues has been remarkable, making it possible
to finance the government's need for funds without recourse to ex-
cessive increases in public debt. Most of the rapid growth in tax
revenues has occurred at the national level and in the social security
contributions. Local tax receipts, as shown in Table 4, have contin-
ued to represent only about 3 per cent of national income—less than
before the war. Indeed, this has been one of the reasons why local
governments have found it difficult to meet demands for better
public services, urban decongestion, and cheap housing. especially
in areas of expanding industry and tourism. National government
revenues, on the other hand, have risen in relation to national in-
come by about 35 per cent in the last decade. Social security taxes,
in constant lire, increased tenfold during the fifteen years after
1947, and have proved to be one of the most income-elastic revenue
sources in the fiscal system.
This sharp increase in social security contributions was caused by.w wn' ..'r..wn,r,rr''rr'... .y.-ry y—rr'Y — -w.'- V,.-'.. -y-wr—,.
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TABLE5
Direct Taxes as a Percentage of Indirect Taxes, 1938 and 1949—61
Local Taxes National Taxes Total Taxes
1938 124.23 42.34 53.12
1949 114.40 27.63 35.76
1950 116.76 25.72 34.00
1951 111.28 27.67 35.46
1952 90.33 28.85 35.18
1953 88.97 28.03 34.43
1954 98.94 27.65 34.99
1955 101.52 27.87 35.08
1956 103.81 29.12 36.09
1957 110.77 29.77 37.18
1958 112.98 30.84 38.26
1959 110.26 31.04 38.12
1960 115.55 30.68 37.73
1961 114.16 32.13 38.42
a number of factors: (1) a gradual extension of coverage from in-
dustry to agriculture and services, (2) an increase in the number of
employees, (3) a sharp reduction in underreporting owing to more
modern accounting methods and the increased bargaining power of
labor, and (4) the increase in wages (to which the contributions are
roughly proportional). However, reforms are needed in the social
security system to curb excessive bureaucratic costs, to reorganize
the social security services within a unitary framework, and, per-
haps, to bring social security within the general tax-expenditure sys-
tem.
A distinctive feature of Italian public finance is the emphasis
given to indirect taxes over direct taxes. Table 5 shows that while
direct taxes have become slightly more important since 1950, they
are still below their prewar level, when they accounted for about
one-third of total tax revenues. Direct taxes have a slight advantage
at the local level, but only account 'for about one-fourth of central
government revenues. However, if social security collections are in-
cluded as direct taxes, then over-all direct taxes nearly equal indi-
rect taxes.176 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE 6




and and Taxes on
PersonalBuildingsSuccessionCorporationIncome
Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes (RM etc.)
1938 42,649 124,213 63,074 239,692
1949 51,034 41,237 68,254 . 149,826
1950 61,400 46,469 59,939 193,543
1951 61,174 49,739 64,306 202,162
1952 61,494 59,025 102,070 224,208
1953 69,353 64,683 120,110 230,628
1954 86,359 79,125 98,680 40,164 270,391
1955 88,930 88,301 79,470 47,862 311,018
1956 97,094 96,523 81,995 62,064349,729
1957 108,020 103,980 77,259 77,370 399,049
1958 125,980 110,070 73,252 93,448451,692
1959 149,437 115,110 70,657 112,777508,544
1960 157,926 121,022 67,011 128,141 559,797
1961 169,697 130,523 69,440 144,059 619,126
Direct Taxes
Personal income taxes play only a minor role in Italian direct
taxation. Most revenue of this type comes from schedular taxes on
various sources of income: labor, enterprise, building, land, and
other capital assets (see Table 6). Taxes on wealth are modest; there
is no such thing as an ordinary property tax (except for corpora-
tions), and death taxes yield very little.
The tax on moveable wealth (imposta di ricchezza mobile), or the
"RM" tax, has trebled its revenue yield in the past decade. The RM
tax is a schedular tax on wages (RM-C9), self-employed income
(RM-C1), enterprises (RM-B), and interest income (RM-A). Table 7
shows the rates applied in 1963.
Broadly speaking, direct taxation in Italy weighs more heavily onItaly 177
TABLE7
1963 Rates of Schedular Income Taxesa
(per cent)
RM Tax Rate
I. Category A (interest)b 30.8
II. Category B (profits of enterprises)°





100,000,000 lire and over 35.0
III. Category C1 (professional income; income from handicrafts;
and income of small traders)°
Under 960,000 lire 10.2
960,000 lire and over 14.9
IV. Category C2 (employment income)b
Under 960,000 lire 4.5
960,000 lire and over 9.5
Tax on income from 29.7
Land taxe 20.4
aTherates are all rounded to the first decimal place; the local government rates
are those for Turin.
b No local government rates.
°Thelocal government rates (communes, provinces, chambers of commerce) are
included; they come to a total of about 5—6 per cent.
ciThelocal government rates are the major part of the total: The rate due to the
national government is 8.9, to the provinces 11.0, to the communes 9.7 per cent.
eHerealso the local government rates are the major part of the total: national
government—5.8, provinces—10.0, and communes—4.5 per cent.Since the
official rates are calculated in current lire on each hundred lire of prewar cadastral
values, we had to deflate them to take account of the average change in cadastral
values as expressed in current lire.
NOTE: For RM C2, C1, and B (individuals), the first 240,000 lire earned by each
taxpayer are exempted. This benefit may be obtained only once by each taxpayer,
who computes it first on his 02 income (if he has any), then on his C1 income, and
then on his B income.
The same rule applies in paying the lower rate on incomes up to 960,000 lire:
each taxpayer applies the 02 rate (if he has any income in this category after taking
the 240,000 lire exemption), then therate, and then the B rate.178 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
wages and profits than it does on interest and rent. This feature of
the tax system hardly seems conducive to economic development if
we accept the thesis—which seems particularly significant for Italy
today—that the ren tier is less important in the growth process than
the entrepreneur and the wage earner.
TAX ON LAND (imposta sui terrent)
The tax on agricultural land is imposed on the owner as shown
by the cadastral rolls and is based on the imputed income attrib-
uted to the land. However, the Italian cadastral values have not
been updated since 1939 except by rough average coefficients ap-
plied uniformly throughout the country. Thus, the present reliabil-
ity of the tax is highly suspect; often marginal lands face a high
burden as rich lands pay low rates. The tax tends to exert its
weight inversely to the liquidity of the farmers affected. In poor lo-
calities with few tax bases other than agriculture, land tax rates
have been pushed higher than in rich agricultural areas with broad-
er tax bases.
There are no general exemptions for incomes below a set mini-
mum, nor are there personal family allowances, because the land
tax is a "real" tax. To reduce the burden of taxation on marginal
agriculture areas, a considerable part of the national agriculture
territories has been declared nontaxable: for example, all the terri-
tories of the communes located even partially at an altitude of 600
meters and over. There has, therefore, been some erosion of the tax
base, which does not always correspond to a real necessity, and a
considerable part of the land tax is still imposed on individuals
who do not have ability to pay.
TAX ON BUILDINGS (imposta sui tab bricati)
The tax on income from buildings has been a poor revenue pro-
ducer for a number of reasons: (1) old houses are still mostly under
rent controls; (2) new "nonluxury" housing (which includes most
because of loopholes in the law) is tax-free for twenty-five years; (3)
assessment practices are inadequate.
In general the exemption of new buildings has seriously aggravat-
ed the financial problems of local governments without significantly7
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aiding low-income families. Rents have become expensive for these
families and thus exert pressure for wage increases, especially in the
more developed industrial areas. If such broad exemptions had
been avoided, local governments might have had more funds to
finance low-cost housing and better public services. This might also
have permitted lower and more equitable tax rates and an earlier
liberalization of rent control.
Assessment has been poor and evasion high. Until 1961, assess-
ments were made on the basis of rent officially declared by the tax-
payers or on the market value of rents for similar buildings in the
neighborhood. The assessor is the state tax authority, although it
gets the smallest share of the tax revenue. Often the parties to a
lease sign two contracts, a "true" one and one used for tax purposes
with rents 30 to 60 per cent less.
The assessment system has been recently reinforced by a "new"
urban cadastre. This, however, is based on the presumed value of
estates in 1938 revalued with national average coefficients, and gen-
erally provides unrealistic values today, thus inducing tax authori-
ties to adopt low revaluation coefficients to avoid excessive, taxation
in certain cases. Since this assessment serves also as a basis for per-
sonal taxes, the erosion and evasion in the assessments are spread
elsewhere.
THE RM TAX (imposta di ricchezza mobile)
In the fiscal reforms initiated by Etio Vanoni in 1951, the schedu-
lar tax on income from capital, capital and labor, and professions
and employment was "personalized" by the introduction of person-
al and family allowances, and of reduced rates for lower-income
families. The intent was to shift to a system of direct taxes and to
use modern methods of assessment rather than outdated presump-
tive measures. The differences in the rates applicable to the
different categories of income reflect, however, a continuing recog-
nition of the fact that it is easier to evade taxes on some types of
personal income than on others. Tax evasion is believed to be par-
ticularly high among self-employed craftsmen, shopkeepers, and
professional people (category C1), partly because the income of
these individuals is difficult to assess accurately, and partly because180 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
of the traditional reluctance of the government to press for strict
enforcement of the income tax statutes applicable to these particu-
lar groups of taxpayers. The rates applicable to this category of in-
come have, accordingly, been set higher than those applicable to
wages (category C2).
The situation with respect to C1 income is open to criticism for
several reasons. First, a good deal of income on which heavy taxes
could be levied without adversely affecting investment or the bal-
ance of payments goes unreported. Second, the reduction in the
effective rate on middle-income taxes has contributed both directly
and (by example) indirectly to increased consumption by all social
classes. And third, small family concerns are favored in comparison
with medium and large-scale enterprises (which are taxed at higher
rates, and with less chance of evasion in category B). This may be
one reason why the Italian distribution system suffers from an ex-
cessive number of small establishments, and why some small shop-
owners hesitate to modernize or expand their businesses.
On the other hand, it is hard to see why commercial enterprises
should not bear the same tax burdens as industrial enterprises of
comparable earning power, nor does it seem reasonable that the in-
come from garages, tailor shops, and shoe repair shops should be
taxed at lower rates (under category C1) than the income from
small manufacturing establishments (under category B). Further-
more, the RM tax on business profits which fall into the latter cate-
gory is not imposed uniformly. While corporations and other col-
lective entities must be assessed on the basis of their accounts, part-
nerships and sole proprietorships may choose whether to be taxed
on this basis or not. Although it would seem that enterprises taxed
on their accounts would have less opportunity to evade taxes than
those not so taxed, the penalties for failure to exhibit accounts, or
•for exhibiting unreliable ones, are quite modest. The major conse-
quence of such "errors" of omission or commission is that the tax
administrators will make a presumptive assessment of the corpora-
tion's profits based on the average earnings of corporations ex-
hibiting reliable accounts. Thus a corporation that earns more than
the average has an incentive to exhibit to the Tax Administration a
patently inaccurate statement of its true earnings. Since the extent
of tax evasion by business enterprises varies considerably, the corn-Italy 181
petitive position of these firms is frequently badly distorted by the
inequality of their effective tax burdens.
It should be recognized, however, that some progress has been
made since 1951 in regard to the assessment of enterprises, even
though the country still has a long way to go if it is to achieve the
objectives of the reforms introduced in that year. Besides improving
assessment procedures, the reforms have introduced new rules for
depreciation.
The "personalization" of the RM tax through the introduction
of personal exemptions and rate graduation for individuals subject
to tax under categories B, C1, and C2 has lessened the severity of
this tax on the lower-income classes. This is an improvement in the
tax structure that might well be extended to income in the form of
interest on the public debt, which is now excluded from the tax
base, and dividend income, which is taxed separately at a flat rate.
PERSONAL INCOME TAXES
Italy's direct tax system also includes both state and local person-
al income taxes and a state "corporation" tax. The starting rate of
the personal income taxes is 2 per cent, with the rates of the state
tax reaching 50 per cent at 500 million lire. The maximum rate of
the local tax is 12 per cent on income in excess of 10 million lire.
For persons in the upper-middle income class, with income between
5 and 10 million lire, the combined burden of the RM tax and the
personal income tax would be higher than the taxes on comparable
U.S. incomes ($8,000-s 1.6,000), especially for married persons,if
there were no evasion. But there is considerable evasion in Italy,
and it tends to increase with income. One indication of this is
found in the fact that the local personal income tax, with much
lower rates on large incomes, yields about the same total revenue as
the national personal income tax.
There are many reasons for the weakness of personal income tax-
ation in Italy, some of which go back to the early 1920's, when
Mussolini effectively eliminated the progressivity of the national
personal income tax and abolished the local taxes. In any case, at
the present time, income from agriculture, and especially that from
the most productive land, is greatly underassessed. There is massive
underreporting of rent and interest income, as there is of profes-— —- — — .-— v—n-- --—a •Y''
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sional income. Thus far no efficient system has been found for the
assessment of dividend income, and capital gains derived from the
sale of land, buildings, and securities are legally exempt from tax
unless they are received by "professional" dealers or traders. Final-
ly, the profits distributed by closely held companies often escape
personal income taxes because of the difficulties encountered in
making assessments of their profits.
Although most of these weaknesses have yet to be corrected, some
steps have been taken since 1951 to improve the situation. Under
the Vanoni tax reforms of that year, individuals for the first time
were required to report income annually for tax purposes. In 1954,
a "corporation" tax was introduced; and two years later the first se-
rious attempt was made to secure information concerning the own-
ership of corporate shares.2 The effect of this was to bring about a
sharp decline in the prices of shares and a massive outflow of capi-
tal to foreign countries. Although much of this capital subsequently
came back to Italy, because it came back seemingly as foreign capi-
tal, it continued to escape taxation.
In 1962, a new method of collecting income tax on dividends and
related income was introduced. This required the recipients of divi-
dends to give their names to the institutions making such payments,
and these institutions in turn were required to report to the Tax
Administration the names of the persons to whom they were paying
dividends. At the same time, corporations and similar entities were
required to make a provisional withholding of personal income tax
with respect to all dividends paid by them. Shareholders were given
the right to ask for reimbursement if the tax withheld exceeded the
amount due from them, and were obligated to pay the difference if
the war years, Italy required the owners of corporation shares to
register them in a central file, but this was done more for the purpose of get.
ting better enforcement of the general property tax, which had been introduced
as a wartime measure, than of preventing personal income tax evasion. Sales of
shares by "temporary" contracts, with the possibility of deferred-payment pur.
chase were not, however, subject to registration. Since these contracts could be
automatically prorogated from month to month, even though the purchaser
might have paid for the shares in full, anyone could become a permanent
owner of shares without this becoming known to the tax authorities. The
1956 law changed this by making it compulsory to report to the Tax Admin-
istration these so-called temporary contracts. But not for long, since the next
government tolerated the introduction on the Stock Market of a new kind of
sale contract which relieved purchasers of shares from the obligation to report
their holdings.—— V ..w.v,.. .-r. — W •__ -, '_ —' -— — —
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the amount due exceeded the amount withheld. In the cases of for-
eign and corporate stockholders, the 15 per cent withholding rate
was the final tax.
As might have been expected, this new regulation had a severe
psychological impact on shareholders, and again there was a heavy
outflow of capital. Even though a substantial part of these funds
may have come back to Italy under the guise of foreign capital, they
generally did so in the form of short-term investments, or as invest-
ments in land or in buildings, thereby contributing to an inflation
in land and building values. The banks were ready to assist their
customers in carrying out both capital exports and imports while
protecting their identity. Neither they nor the government appar-
ently realized how dangerous these developments were for the con-
tinued growth and sound expansion of the Italian economy.3
One result was a sharp deterioration in the Italian balance of
payments, which brought the government to the realization that
something had to be done. But what to do? The government does
not want sharp restriction on international capital movements, nor,
under well.established principles of Italian law, can it tax its own
citizens on income that is neither produced nor disposed of in Italy.
The problem is one of making it attractive for Italians to bring their
capital back to Italy without sacrificing the principle of uniformity,
or horizontal equity, in the taxation of dividend income. This
problem has not yet been resolved, nor have any really satisfactory
proposals yet been advanced for its resolution.
In direct Taxes
Indirect taxation constitutes the most important part of the hal-
ian tax system. In a country which has suffered much from wars,
foreign occupation, and dictatorships, and in which little reliance
could be placed on voluntary compliance with direct taxes, the ea-
siest and surest way to raise the revenues needed to finance large
situation was further aggravated by the circumstance that thenation-
alization of electricity occurred at about the same time the new regulations
regarding corporate shares went into effect. The fact that the government was
paying out large cash indemnities at the same time it was discouraging invest.
ment in corporate shares contributed to the outflow of capital funds and to
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public expenditure has been through a multiplicity of relatively
small levies imposed on virtually all transactions.
The major indirect tax is a general turnover tax on sales of goods
and services imposed at every level of economic activity from pro-
duction to consumption (IGE: Imposta Generale Milla Entiota).
The only classes of sales excluded from the base of this tax are real
estate, securities or interests therein, services of the Post Office and
of the State Railways, and (as of three years ago) sales of retailers
and small craftsmen. IGE's revenue yield is about equal to that of
all the direct taxes of the state.
The general rate of this "queen" of the indirect taxes is &3 per
cent. There are, however, a variety of higher and lower rates, some
of which are intended to introduce an element of discrimination
into the structure of this tax, while others are used to lessen some of
the distortions that inevitably arise from the "cumulative" effects of
this type of sales tax. It is recognized that a product "incorporates"
as much sales tax into its own price as the number of stages through
which its various components pass.
Differences in the effect of the multistage tax may arise, not only
as between one product and another but also in the case of the
same product when it is produced by firms with different degrees of
vertical integration either at the manufacturing or at the distribu-
tion level of production. A series of measures have been adopted to
take care of the most striking cases of this sort. Among them, the
most common is the so-called system of una tan turn, or "condensed
rates." Instead of taxing all the possible stages through which a cer-
tain product may pass, only one typical stage for that product is
subject to tax, but with a higher than normal rate. This higher rate
is called a condensed rate, and it is calculated so as to include the
average tax burden presumed to be saved at the other stages by a
"representative" firm in the industry. As a result, there are a wide
variety of these condensed rates, which are based, not on tax policy
considerations, but on the more or less accidental fact that certain
products do on the average pass through more hands before they
reach the consumer than others do. IGE is an effective revenue pro-
ducer, but it cannot be considered a good instrument of "qualita-
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Other indirect taxes imposed by the state include a number of
manufacturers' excises and consumption taxes on such commodities
as gasoline, diesel oil, sugar, alcohol, beer, coffee, electricity, and
textiles. The state also holds a fiscal monopoly on tobacco and on
salt. There are also local consumption taxes on electric power,
meats, building materials, and soft drinks.
As in the case of the general turnover tax, the justification of
these other indirect levies is found mainly in their yield, and in
some cases they may have perverse economic effects. For example,
the tax on automobile sales, which is highly progressive with re-
spect to horsepower, is imposed at the same rate on old cars as on
new ones. This, when combined with high gasoline taxes, creates a
strong preference for new cars and leads to the premature destruc-
tion of old ones. Thus automobile taxation fails to limit the num-
ber of vehicles or to relieve road congestion and encourages shifts to
newer cars with low fuel consumption.
Equity Versus Growth
The heavy reliance on indirect taxes in the Italian tax system,
when taken together with the Tax Administration's inability to
prevent a considerable amount of income tax avoidance within the
middle and upper income classes, has meant that the over-all dis-
tribution of tax burdens has been for the most part either propor-
tional or regressive as one moves up or down the income scale. Al-
though this has aroused some protest from the lower income classes,
and has probably been a factor in the high percentage of votes cast
for the extreme left, the question remains whether this develop-
ment has been favorable to economic growth.
A proportional distribution of tax burdens may, of course, favor
the accumulation of savings by the upper income classes; it may
also have fewer adverse effects on incentives to save, invest, or man-
age enterprises than would a progressive distribution. Finally, pro-
portional taxation may serve to contain certain excesses in total
consumer demand, and so temper the effect of rising income on
mass expenditures among the lower income classes.
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definite advantages from the standpoint of economic growth. In the
first place, the principal way of combining the requirements of eco-
nomic development with those of monetary stability is to formulate
and follow an "income policy." But an incomes, policy requiring self-
restraints on the part of labor, or other means to prevent wage in-
creases, calls for the control of other incomes as well. One cannot
expect the masses to accept austerity unless certain standards of
fiscal equity are maintained, presumably involving sacrifices for the
others.
Second, progressive income taxation may not have such negative
effects on personal savings as one might suppose from the way in
which the average propensity to save rises with income. The re-
search findings of Friedman, Modigliani, and others have cast some
doubt on an unqualified proposition that savings increase more
than in proportion to income in a given community in a given pe-
riod of time. But beside this, one has to consider that consumption
often rises from a desire to emulate. This desire seems to be partic-
ularly strong in countries experiencing sharp increases in income
starting from levels much lower than those prevailing in more ad-
vanced countries. The lack of effective progressive income taxation
in Italy seems to have been responsible for the exceptionally high
level of consumption attained by large social groups belonging to
the medium and upper income classes, and the consumption pat-
terns of these groups ap.pear to have exerted an upward thrust on all
consumption patterns, including those of the lower income groups.
As a result, the average propensity to save in all income classes
has probably been reduced, while the increments received by wage
earners have gone, not into savings, but into expenditures for
"something more" than the normal consumption necessities. Cars
and other durable goods, and a rich diet including much meat, are
now considered normal by the Italian population, although that
country's national income is still not high enough to provide every-
one with these semiluxuries. Instalment credit has made it possible
for many Italians to spend beyond their present financial means, so
that long-awaited increases in income have enabled them to pay off
old instalment contracts and to go deeper into debt.
Third, in Italy a lot of private saving is used for speculation, is-'-V
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hoarded, or is spent on such luxury items as villas and yachts rather
than invested in industrial or agricultural enterprises. Furthermore,
those persons who enjoy large capital gains from the sale of land or
securities are often from the ren tier rather than the entrepreneurial
class. This money, too, is as likely to be invested in assets which
seem likely to produce more capital gains than in a business ven-
ture which promises to earn a profit.
In any case, there is a considerable difference between a tax sys-
tem which uses a broadly based income tax as a flexible instrument
of fiscal policy and one such as the Italian in which the use of per-
sonal taxation on medium and high income classes is virtually re-
nounced. With a weak personal income tax, the potency of fiscal
policy as an instrument of stabilization is greatly impaired. During
the initial phase of its postwar expansion, Italy was able to get
along fairly well despite the crudeness of certain of its instruments
of public policy. During this phase, both unemployment and un-
deremployment made inflationary pressures relatively easy to con-
trol, as did rapid technological progress and increasing productivi-
ty. But in the next phase of its recent development, a strong person-
al income tax may be very important.
Flexibility of the Tax Structure
Despite the weight given to indirect taxation in the Italian tax
structure, there is perhaps more flexibility in it than one might ex-
pect, in the sense that revenue yields are fairly sensitive to changes
in levels of national income and business activity. IGE is paid on
an ad valorem basis, and remittances must usually be made every
week or every month. Therefore, as the volume of business transac-
tions changes, the IGE revenue changes too. The gasoline tax is a
specific levy that has to be paid as the product is put on the market,
and the same is true of most excises and national consumption taxes.
Most of these taxes are imposed on commodities which have a high
income elasticity.
Owing to the cadastral method of assessment and to the exemp-
tion of new estates, real taxes on agriculture and buildings cannot
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and the personal income tax are more sensitive to economic fluctua-
tions; their yields tend to rise with increases in the level ofeconom-
ic activity. But the existing system of assessment and collection in-
troduces a systematic lag between changes in income levels and
changes in tax receipts. Individual taxpayers file theirreturns for
any given year on the basis of the income they had received in the
previous year. The tax authorities usually publish the current year's
tax rolls around June, and, except for taxes on wages, collections
extend over twelve months beginning in August. Notwithstanding
the practice of withholding taxes on wages and salaries, the collec-
tion of these levies is not much quicker. The firm that withholds
taxes on wages paid weekly or monthly during one calendar year
has to remit these amounts to the Tax Administration during the
following year in six bimonthly instalments. As a result of this col-
lection lag, business enterprises enjoy temporary excesses of liquid-
ity during periods when wages or tax rates are rising.
It must be added that it is a widespread practice for enterprises
to underestimate their profits in their annual returns. The Tax Ad-
ministration does make periodic checks of returns and, since it is
accustomed to regard underreporting as normal practice, ordinarily
systematically increases reported taxable profits. Consequently, most
enterprises prefer to keep their annual returns as low as possible.
One result of this "pull and push" operation is that a considerable
portion of the tax ultimately paid (possibly as much as 50 per cent)
is collected with much delay.
Proposed Tax Reforms
There is a growing consensus in Italy that the existing tax system
should be reformed. As regards the direct taxes, stricter methods of
assessment and a more energetic administration are much needed.
Personalization of the schedular income taxes and simplification
and unification of the system of direct taxes is also necessary, al-
though these changes will raise many technical and broad policy
problems. Some persons contend that a property tax should be in-
troduced to redress the discrimination against labor income in the
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for labor income instead of bringing in the new tax. There are also
problems associated with the taxation of corporate income. Here
the high rate of the real tax on profits might be replaced by changes
in the rate structure of the corporation tax, but then the problem
of the tax treatment of small business (both incorporated and unin-
corporated) would have to be faced.
As for indirect taxation, the prevailing view is that the pres-
ent complex of indirect taxes should be abolished and replaced by
a much simpler system composed only of a general value-added tax
(which would replace the IGE) to be assessed at uniform rates on
gross value-added minus gross investment, and of a wholesale or
purchase tax which would be imposed at differentiated rates and
would replace all state and most local commodity taxes. Local com-
munities would have only a few taxes on commodities, which could
be assessed locally: electricity, meat, building materials, and build-
ing rents. lEt has been estimated that the present yield of all local
consumption taxes could be obtained if the local authorities were
given the present state and local taxes on these four items.
These changes are opposed mainly on administrative, psychologi-
cal, and political grounds. Although the outsider may find IGE ex-
tremely complicated, the Italian Tax administration maintains
that this is the easiest tax to collect and the only one by means of
which it is possible to raise as much revenue as is needed to combat
inflation and to reduce budget deficits. It is true that IGE produces
a considerable yield with a limited effort by the tax authority. But
this is largely due to the imprecision of assessments, which allows a
large amount of evasion. It is also true that the tax authority can
rely on IGE to provide large additional revenues at times of finan-
cial difficulty. But this is a very crude instrument from the point of
view of economic policy. Moreover, raising the general IGE rates
during a period of inflation might be self-defeating, since any in-
crease might be transmitted to consumer prices and, through the
escalator clause connecting wages to the official living-cost index,
automatically to money wages.
The capacity of IGE to raise additional yields is broad only if a
general rise in rates is considered; it is much more limited if a p01-
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The IGE administration is prepared to introduce a certain amount
of rate discrimination, but not to the extent of making fine distinc-
tions among commodities. It is accustomed only to differentiate
among classes of enterprises that are only roughly defined, and be-
tween the various methods of assessment, which is a very different
thing.
Another reason for the opposition to a reform of the indirect tax
system, such as that outlined above, is the fear of taxpayer oppo-
sition to such a burden of indirect taxation if the aggregate rate of
tax on individual commodities should become easy to figure out.
The Italian indirect tax system is now about as "indirect" as one
could imagine, since in it taxes are not only concealed in the prices
of commodities but are also scattered through many different stages
and components of production. No producer or dealer has much
idea of the amount of indirect tax in the goods he manufactures or
distributes. This maximizes the extent of tax illusion. But at the
same time, n-iany Italians know in general that they are being heav-
ily taxed, and they are troubled by the arbitrariness and the unnec-
essary complexity of the system. All this adds up to the develop-
ment of a very poor attitude toward paying taxes.
III. TAX INCENTIVES FOR GROWTH
Let us now examine some specific features of the Italian tax sys-
tem which are of particular interest to us as instruments of tax poi-
icy for economic growth. These are (1) the so-called tax on compa-
nies, (2) the accelerated depreciation allowances and the allowances
for new investment, and (3) the special incentives given for invest-
ment in the Mezzogiorno and in the depressed areas of central-
northern Italy.
The Tax on Companies (Imposta sulle Societa)
The tax on companies, which was introduced in Italy in 1954, is
considerably different from the corporation taxes found in most
other countries. It consists of a 15 per cent tax on business prof-
its exceeding 6 per cent of the company's invested capital, and a
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0.75 per cent tax on invested capital.4 This pair of taxes was, of
course, designed so as to give a "pincers" effect. The invested capi-
tal declared for purposes of the 0.75 per cent tax must be the same
as that used in calculating the 6 per cent exclusion from the tax on
"excess"profits. Consequently, if a company underdeclares the
value of its invested capital, it runs the risk of having to pay a
heavier profits tax; or if it overstates its invested capital in order to
minimize this risk, it of course has to pay a higher tax on its capital.
In theory, therefore, the pincers system is supposed to compel cor-
porations to make realistic declarations. However, there are many
exceptions.
In the first place, a corporation may succeed in underassessing
both profits and capital. Since the tax administrators frequently
check the value of a company's invested capital by comparing it
with profits and vice versa, the opportunities for substantial avoid-
ance of both taxes are good if tax administration is weak, as it tends
to be in Italy.
Second, the pincers method may not work in the cases of corpora-
tions whose profits on invested capital tend to be less than 6 per cent.5
This may be the case particularly for corporations whose capital
consists mostly of undeveloped land which they intend to hold
until such time as they are ready to sell, or to use it themselves for
building purposes. Under Italian law, capital gains do not have to
be included in taxable profits until such time as the asset has been
disposed of, or until its appreciated value has been indicated in the
company's balance sheet. Therefore, corporations owning assets of
this type may, for a considerable period of time, understate the true
value of their capital assets and enjoy substantial tax advantages
without jeopardizing their position with respect to the tax on "ex-
cess" profits. The company tax has in this way encouraged invest-
ment in land for building purposes, and has thus fostered the
Invested capital is defined as the paid-up capital stock of the company plus
all surplus reserves (except those representing fixed or determinable liabilities)
and any undistributed profits carried over from preceding periods.
Profits subject to the 15 per cent tax are calculated net of the RM tax and
other income taxes. Consequently, a corporation may earn up to as much
as 9 per cent on its invested capital without becoming subject to the compa-
nies tax, since "real" taxes tend to run about BO per cent of corporate income.192 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
inflation of land prices and the diversion of capital from other
more productive uses.
The tax on companies also favors new industrial enterprises as
long as they have low profits. Such enterprises reduce their tax lia-
bilities by understating their invested capital until such time as
they begin to earn high enough profits to make them subject to the
15 per cent tax on excess profits. Thus, new enterprises may secure
personal income tax advantages for their stockholders by retaining
and reinvesting their earnings for a number of years without in-
creasing their company tax liabilities. From this standpoint, the tax
may be said to favor capital accumulation and to reward initiative
on the part of small, growing firms.
Enterprises with low productivity due to low capital intensity
may also be helped by this mechanism in their efforts to modernize.
Their productivity can of course be increased through an increase
in investment and renewal of equipment. Such firms can reinvest
their profits and increase their capital without any increase in the
corporation tax on capital until a substantial productivity increase
has been achieved and the pincers system becomes effective.
In a dualistic economy like the Italian one, having enterprises
with quite different strengths and possibilities for growth, there
may be good reasons to have a tax favoring enterprises with low
productivity. The less an enterprise is taxed, the more it is able to
grow and to reinforce itself. But this is true only from the point of
view of the income effects of taxation.
From the point of view of incentives, there are opposite effects. It
is self-evident that a corporation tax structure such as the one
scribed above taxes marginal profits quite heavily and puts a
differential burden .on risky enterprise profits. To be sure, this disin-
centive is felt only after an enterprise crosses a certain threshold.
Yet it may also work against an owner-operated business that is
growing rapidly and is considering the possibility of raising more
capital through incorporation.
The status of the Italian company tax might possibly be im-
proved by the adoption of special measures which would favor en-
terprises having fluctuating incomes and newly incorporated busi-
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of averaging profits of several years and to the deduction of some
specific reserve funds used to cover certain definite risks.
The greatest fault of the Italian company tax scheme, however,
seems to be that it deals in the same way with real estate companies
or family companies set up mainly to reduce personal income tax
liabilities on personal properties as it does with enterprises carrying
out industrial activities. In some instances its rates favor the reten-
tion of profits. This may be justified when it encourages industrial
development, but unfortunately this is not always the case.
On the other hand, severe tax burdens on companies having a
limited family basis may be justified by the fact that these compa-
nies are suspected of being instruments for evading personal taxes.
Yet often the result is that some small industrial enterprises are
penalized when they should have been helped to grow. The eco-
nomic difference between the small family company that carries on
a business enterprise and the one organized to administer capital
possessions is quite large; the former corresponds to the entrepre-
neur type and the latter to the ren tier type. A tax policy designed
to promote economic growth ought to differentiate between these
two cases and should at least avoid giving a more favorable treat-
ment to the ren tier than to the entrepreneur.
A ccelera ted Depreciation and Investment Allowances
Let us next consider some of the provisions of the Italian tax
statutes permitting accelerated depreciation and granting initial a!-
lowances for new investments.
Accelerated depreciation became a permanent feature of the Ital-
ian tax system in 1951, when business enterprises were given the op-
portunity of reducing, by not more than two-fifths, the period of
depreciation with respect to investment in new plant and equip-
ment, as well as in the enlargement, conversion, and rebuilding of
existing buildings or machinery. Thus, in addition to normal
depreciation, accelerated depreciation not in excess of 15 per cent of
the cost of the asset is allowed in each of the first two years of the
depreciation period. A similar additional allowance not in excess of
10 per cent of cost is permitted in the third year, which adds up to194 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
40 per cent. Moreover, the accelerated depreciation period starts in
the year in which the investment is made, whereas the ordinary
depreciation period starts in the year in which the new investment
begins to produce.
In addition to the accelerated depreciation allowances described
above, an extra 10 per cent of cost could be taken as an initial al-
lowance under a 1956 statute which was effective only for the years
1957-59 inclusive. This allowance could be taken only for purposes
of the RM tax on profits, and in no case could it exceed 5 per cent
of the firms's "reported" income.°
This temporary initial allowance for new investment has been
extended, and in 1963 a new bill was introduced which would ex-
tend it for another three years and, in addition, raise the allowance
itself from 10 to 15 per cent. Moreover, the limitation on the size of
this allowance with respect to income would be lifted from 5 to 12
per cent. If enacted, these proposed changes in the law should be
particularly helpful to new and growing small enterprises whose
profits are likely to be small in relation to their new investments.
Both the 1956 law and the 1963 bill limit the extra allowances to
enterprises which are taxed on the basis of their accounts. The aim
of this limitation is, of course, to encourage small enterprises to
elect to be assessed on this basis. The limitation may, however,
serve only to diminish the impact of the temporary allowances on
economic growth. The attempt to achieve two objectives through
this one statute may reduce the likelihood of attaining either.
Under the Italian tax laws, the straight-line method is the only
one allowed for purposes of normal depreciation. The basis for
depreciation is always "historic" cost. Changes in the purchasing
power of money are not thought to be relevant to the assessment of
asset values. Therefore, an enterprise which sells an asset at a figure
higher than the purchase price less depreciation realizes a taxable
capital gain which must be included in the profits of the year in
which the sale took place. This is so even if, at the time when the
asset was purchased, money had a purchasing power higher than
It was thought that this last dause would stimulate enterprises to report
taxable incomes nearer to the true ones in order to enjoy a larger allowance
for new investment.—_- -r -
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the one current at the time of sale. It must be added, however, that
in the years immediately following the war, special extraordinary
rules were adopted to take account of the effects of postwar inflation
on the nominal and real of enterprises' assets.
It is likely that such extraordinary measures would be introduced
again if a great inflationary explosion were to happen, whereas they
will not be reintroduced as long as we have only "creeping" inflation
and some scant inflationary pressure. It must, however, be added
that an enterprise may always revalue its capital assets spontane-
ously, pay the tax on capital gains, and increase the basis of them for
depreciation. At any rate it remains true that straight-line deprecia-
tion based on historic costs, with the possibility of some evaluation
of assets at nominal prices, tends to include some capital in taxable
profits. Accelerated depreciation and additional allowances for new
investments are needed, first of all, on these grounds.
There are, of course, other reasons too. First, tax deductions re-
lating to production costs are somewhat restrictive in Italy. They
are regulated by the principle that a cost may be deducted only
when it is inherent in that production; i.e., not all production ex-
penses actually supported can be deducted, only those which "can-
not be avoided." In practice it is very difficult to separate inherent
expenses from noninherent costs, and the principle of inherency is
applied in dubious cases as a restrictive rule. Businessmen often
complain that this rule fails to recognize the necessity of certain
costs connected with technological and industrial progress and mod-
em selling systems. So far, Italian tax authorities have shown a ten-
dency to resist these pressures on the general front of the inherency
rule, and yet to make concessions on the "specific" front of deduc-
tions related to depreciation and investment allowances.
According to the claims of businessmen, official coefficients of tax
depreciation are often calculated on periods longer than those usu-
ally taken into account when early obsolescence is expected. How-
ever, in a substantially dualistic industrial structure such as is found
in Italy, it is difficult to establish coefficients of depreciation that
will be equally good both for technologically advanced business and
for the others that make use of tools and machinery which to the
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tial investment allowance and the accelerated depreciation have
been conceived as measures to encourage capital accumulation in
any kind of enterprise.
Some critics object to these policies on the ground that the gov-
ernment should not try to stimulate investment by strengthening
the self.financing capacity of business firms. This, it is said, tends to
direct economic development primarily along the same lines and
within the same firms that have already been successful. Moreover,
these policies are said to encourage industrial concentration. In
reply to the last point, it may be suggested that, with the integra-
tion of the Italian economy into the European Common Market,
firms which would appear large in relation to the Italian market
may turn out to be small in relation to the European one.
Tax Incentives for the Development of Southern Italy
In Italy the idea of tax exemptions for underdeveloped areas took
hold in 1951, when a new plan was devised to give systematic aid to
the South (continental Mezzogiorno plus Sicily and Sardinia). The
plan wasadopted andtheCassaperiiMezzogiorno was
established.7
Tax benefits given in the South may be classified as follows: ex-
emptions granted to profits produced in the South, exemptions
granted to profits made in any part of the country but invested in
the South, and various concessions in the field of indirect taxation.
Profits arising from investments made in southern "technically
The Cassa per ii Mezzogiorno (which should terminate in 1965, although it
will probably be extended with some modifications) devoted its funds mainly to
public works during the first period of its activity. After 1958, the Cassa'sef-
forts were addressed, to a greater extent than before, toward giving loans at
reduced rates and capital funds to new industrial undertakings in the South
and, lastly, toward technical assistance. A new law of 1957 obliged public enter-
prises controlled by the Ministry of State Participation(i.e., corporations in
which the majority of shares is held by a public holding owned in its turn by
the state)to allocate 40 per cent of their new investment to the South. A
variety of industrial enterprises (a huge new steel plant by Finsider, IRI, in
Taranto, petrochemical enterprises and oil refineries by ENI, some new plants
in the fields of cement, engineering, and so on) were thus realized. It was hoped
that these enterprises could become the nucleus of a new industrial develop.
ment, attracting a variety of other enterprises. 'Sofar, however, the process
seems to be quite slow.Italy 197
organized" industrial enterprises are exempted from the RM. tax for
a ten-year period from the date of investment. The exemption is
granted to all undertakings started before June 30, 1965. The ex-
emption does not cover local rates added to RM and special state
additionals,8 or corporation tax or national and local personal in-
come taxes.
Industrial income alone is exempted. Income derived from prop-
erties or shares owned by the enterprise or from a commercial activ-
ity not complementary to or integrated with the industrial activity
is wholly taxable, although the industrial income of the same enter-
prise is exempted.
The exemption covers only industrial enterprises with fixed in-
stallations, machinery, and other equipment "technically orga-
nized" for production. Many questionable cases have arisen in re-
spect to this point. And it has been held that neither a movie thea-
ter nor a hotel are technically organized industries according to this
law. The same ruling has been made with respect to commodity
transportation, but in the case of a dry-cleaning establishment the
answer was in the affirmative, on condition that such an enterprise
was equipped with modern machinery and was organized as an in-
dustry and not a small artisan's shop. The exemption is given not
only to entirely new enterprises but also to new investment in the
reactivation, transformation, or enlargement of former enterprises.
In these cases, the ten-year period of exemption begins from the
date of "increased capacity," and affects only the increment of in-
vestment. Thus the old part of an enterprise might not enjoy the
exemption, while the new part of it would.
Income supposed to come from "new capacity" is determined in
the initial year of its operation as a percentage aggregate "in-
dustrial" income of the enterprise. This percentage remains fixed
throughout the ten-year period of exemption, whatever may be the
aggregate industrial income of the enterprise in each single year
thereafter.
Another tax benefit favoring the South consists of an exemption
8RMaccounts for about two-thirds and local and state additionals to it for
the remaining one-third of the total burden of real taxes on profits. Local
authorities "may" (but are not obliged to) reduce their rates on these indus.
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from the RM tax of profits earned anywhere in Italy, by enterprises
taxed on the basis of accounts, when they are invested in the South
for improvement and conversion of agricultural lands or industrial
plants fulfilling the criteria of the southern economy's "organic de-
velopment." The exemption cannot, however, exceed 50 per cent of
the total expense of the project in which the investment is made, or
50 per cent of the profits reported by the taxpayer making the
investment.9
This benefit has been granted to profits taxable from fiscal year
1958/59 to fiscal year 1964/65. The investment must be undertaken
within the year following that in which the exemption was granted,
and must be finished within three years. When these conditions are
not met, the taxpayer not only loses the exemption but also has to
pay a surcharge equal to 50 per cent of the tax. Taxable profits not
reported by the taxpayer are excluded from the amount on which
the 50 per cent exemption is calculated.10
A third group of tax advantages for southern development con-
sists in a variety of concessions in the field of indirect taxation. The
most important, perhaps, is the exemption from customs duties on
machinery imported from abroad and installedinsouthern
enterprises.h1 Other important exemptions are those for the registry
taxes due on chartering of corporations and on loans granted for
industrial undertakings in the South, and those for local consump-
tion taxes on building materials employed in factories and in pub-
lic works in the Mezzogiorno.
Until recently, the effects of these tax exemptions appeared rather
°Suppose taxpayer A has1billion lire of "reported" taxable profits and
invests 800 million in a plant in the South. He enjoys the exemption on
400 million because of the limit of 50 per cent of the cost. Suppose, then, that
taxpayer B has also1billion of "reported" taxable profits and invests the
whole of it in the South in a plant costing 2 billion. B's exemption will cover
only 500 million because of the limit of 50 per cent of reported profits. Since
the RM tax is about two-thirds of total taxes on profits, total saving of real
taxes is about one-third of the aggregate burden in the most favorable case.
Personal and corporate taxes, of course, must still be paid.
10Since 1960. tax exemption has also been granted to firms which invest in
the shares of other companies, on condition that the capital so investedis
devoted entirely to ventures in the South, which would be entitled to the ex-
emption under the law. If the shares are subsequenttly sold, the exemption is
rescinded, and any taxes previously saved must be paid in full.
11Thisexemption has raised much criticism among Italian producers of in-
vestment goods, e.g., those of machinery for electric power plants.- —,-,-.,-.--_ ''
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small and disappointing, since few industrial businesses have so far
developed in the Mezzogiornol2 apart from the ventures by state en-
terprises. Moreover, new undertakings have been particularly lim-
ited in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises belonging to
light industry and big industry's subsidiary and collateral sectors,
which represent the "nursery" and the "connective tissue" of a grow-
ing industrial area. It must, however, be said that in the last two
years things have changed a bit. Actually, a larger number of enter-
prises have settled in the South, or are at least considering the pos-
sibility with greater interest than in the past.
The effects of tax exemptions for new investment in new areas
need time to mature. After the tax exemption is granted, some time
must elapse before enterprises become fully aware of the benefit
and, above all, before the exemption can enter into investment de-
cisions. New ventures materializing today are often the result of a
decision process which matured only after several years of study and
discussion. The risk of modifying decisions already made in order
to take into account the new fact of tax exemption may be actually
very high. It would therefore be unreasonable to expect that a
newly introduced tax benefit should become operative very soon.
The tax benefits 'for the South cover a variety of taxes and situa-
tions, although their quantitative aggregate impact for the single
taxpayer appears on balance not to be great. The exemption for
profits produced in the South is quite high in terms of tax rates,
and yet it is limited with respect to time, i.e., the first ten years. It
often happens that several of the first ten years of a new venture
end without any profit or even with some loss.
Moreover, in 1956, the "carryover" of each year's losses to the
next five business years was introduced in the Italian RM tax sys-
tem. This reduced the advantage of a ten-year exemption for many
enterprises, since the carryover may be sufficient to eliminate tax
liabilities for a number of business years. Similarly, "accelerated"
depreciation and allowances for new investment reduce the relative
attractiveness of the ten-year exemption for incomes produced in
Sincea large number of credit incentives were also given to the South,
some criticism must also be directed at them. The cumbersome procedures and
the heavy mortgages attached to these credit facilities seem to have been respon-
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the South as well as of the differential treatment in favor of the
profits invested there.
A full exemption of profits earned anywhere in Italy and em-
ployed in the South perhaps might be more effective than the ten-
year exemption of profits derived from new ventures, since it would
have an immediate and important income effect in addition to the
incentive effect. Small and medium-.sized firms might derive great
advantages from such income effect, especially in underdeveloped
areas where investment risks are high and the financial market is
quite limited.
A capitalist deciding to invest in the South may often prefer to
associate with another Italian or foreign enterprise that already has
had some experience in the field, instead of venturing in entirely on
his own. It must then be recalled that such investments have been
eligible for the exemption on profits only since 1960. It is, there-
fore, only since that year that the whole provision has had substan-
tial scope, so it is too early to judge its effectiveness on the basis of
the results.
Italian taxes are not well assessed. Therefore the effective tax rate
on profits is often less than the "legal" one, and the actual tax sav-
ings that would result from an exemption would tend to be smaller
than the legal rules might lead one to expect. Furthermore, in a sit-
uation of weak tax assessment, the very request for an exemption
may have the result of calling the attention of the administration to
the accounts of the taxpayer applying for it. As a result, instead of
paying less, he might end up paying more.
Strong incentives were needed to move the new ventures from
North to South in an economy such as the Italian one of the 1950's,
when expansion in the North was very easy and fresh manpower
was readily available there because of internal migrations, whereas
southern environmental conditions were rather poor. In the former
area there were also many external economies, and in the latter too
many external diseconomies. However, now congestion is spreading
in the North, and in the South some external economies are finally
developing.
As new enterprises are brought to the South by credit or tax in-
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investment, environmental conditions favorableto establishing
other new enterprises are automatically created. Undoubtedly, the
disadvantages to be overcome are still great and, therefore, a big
push is still necessary.
Although the South has plenty of labor and wage rates are lower
than in the North, these advantages have not played a significant
role in promoting southern enterprises. Higher wages paid in the
North often correspond to higher productivity made possible by the
existence of skilled labor locally available and capable of training
and directing the unskilled labor recruited in the South.
In the South, on the other hand, lower wages are paid to native
labor, whereas skilled labor has to be imported from the North in
order to train, direct, and integrate the local labor force. Northern
skilled workers have to be paid higher wages than in the North in
order to compensate them for the displacement cost.
The population of northern Italy has a lower propensity to immi-
grate, and yet that region has a much larger supply of entrepreneu-
rial skill and qualified laborers. On the other hand, the workers of
southern Italy have a high propensity to immigrate and much less en-
trepreneurial skill and technical know-how. No wonder, therefore,
that in a country like Italy population as well as production end up
by concentrating in the North.
Up until now, the government's efforts to industrialize the South
have been too widely dispersed. Better results might be obtained if
itsefforts could be concentrated in small,strategically chosen
areas.13
In this way, "growth centers" might be established which could
in time bring about a self-sustained growth process in the limited
geographical areas.
The new strategy of development based on growth centers is little
by little becoming a part of the Italian government's policy for the
South. At present, however, attempts to make use of it are being
limited to public enterprises, whatever their field of activity may
Sometimes the easy availability of initial capital to start new enterprises in
the South appears to have led to waste, with difficulty in finding further capital
for the enterprises. Technical assistance might be helpful in reducing this waste,
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be, and in a timid sort of way to public works in general. Further-
more, as yet no fiscal or financial aids have been developed to sup-
port such a policy. Instead of granting moderate tax concessions to
all industrial investments made in the South, more substantial ones
might be given to enterprises operating within established "growth
poles." If this were done, entrepreneurs who planned to establish
new businesses in the areas selected could anticipate the probable
location nearby of many other industrial enterprises, public works,
and other facilities.
Unhappily, the policy of developing a limited number of growth
centers is faced with two kinds of difficulties. The first is that there
are too many local pressure groups scattered throughout the under-
developed area, each of which is trying to build its own growth cen-
ters. Second, some control over the prices of building land is needed
if the policy of spatially concentrated industrial development is to
be effective. The more limited the area of any chosen growth center
is, the easier it will be for the present landowners to reap much of
the gain from industrialization.
Brief mention should also be made of the tax concessions that are
currently being given to industries in the depressed areas of central
and northern Italy. The profits of new small industrial firms and
handicraft firms established in this area and considered "depressed"
during the period from 1857 to 1965 are given a ten-year exemption
from the RM tax and from state and local additions thereto.'4 Ac-
cording to the law, these exemptions apply to those central-north-
ern areas that are characterized as mountainous and to local com-
munities recognized by the government as"economically de-
pressed," so long as they have less than 10,000 inhabitants.
Any local community whose population increases above this level
after the benefit has been granted (perhaps under the effect of the
incentive itself) cannot lose the "depressed area" qualification.
These tax concessions, which were intended to aid certain de-
pressed areas of cental-northern Italy, have not worked out satisfac-
torily. In practice they have been little more than occasional and
paternalistic concessions given to some of the less wealthy local
Enterprises employing no more than100 workers, exclusive of white-
collars, are considered "small" by the law.Italy 203
communities under the pressure of local political representatives,
quite outside of any comprehensive governmental program. Some of
the areas qualified as depressed were actually not suited for in-
dustrial development, while in other areas nearby, not so designa-
ted, conditions were more favorable for industrialization.
In order to carry out an efficient policy of space reallocation, a
comprehensive program should be developed and the whole prob-
lem of tax incentives should be reconsidered. Districts should be
viewed from the standpoint both of their existing economic struc-
tures and also of what they will have in the future, each one sepa-
rately and then all together within the framework of a complete
system of public choices and alternatives. Above all, it should be
recognized that the granting of financial aid and tax concessions on
a piecemeal basis makes no sense and accomplishes nothing.
COMMENT
SIRO LOMBARDINO, UNIVERSITY OF TURIN
Francesco Forte has offered some very interesting comments on
theeffectsof recent Italiantax policy on economic growth.
But I think that what we can learn from this policy is what should
not be done rather than what should be done to foster growth. It is
my opinion that the fiscal system in any country, and this is partic-
ularly true in the case of Italy, can be explained better in terms of
some sociopolitical theory than in terms of the economic analysis of
the value alternatives.
Nevertheless I shall myself make a few comments on the problem
under consideration, mostly from the point of view of an economist
who isinterested in an analysis of the factors accounting for
growth. Two different problems arise when one considers Italian
tax policy in relation to the country's program for economic de-
velopment. The first concerns the actual structure of the tax system,
and the second the way in which tax policy should be administered
in order to foster economic growth.
Forte has already shown very clearly how the actual structure of204 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
the tax system was shaped through the successive introduction of
new levies without any consideration to the over-all impact of the
tax system on economic growth. Perhaps we should recall the main
reasons why the system is so inefficient. First, the cost of collecting
taxes is very high because there are so many opportunities to avoid
them. Second, the manner in which indirect taxes are imposed dis-
torts patterns of productions. Third, the direct tax system tends to
penalize productivity. Fourth, the system fails to serve as an auto-
matic stabilizer. Fifth, the procedure whereby personal income and
business profits are determined and taxes are collected creates a
sense of insecurity which is not conducive to enterprise, especially
on the part of small and medium-sized firms.
•The need 'for tax revision in Italy is now widely recognized.
Something has to be done, but for two reasons the situation has not
changed substantially. First, we need to create a more efficient sys-
tem of reporting and collecting taxes by combining some levies and
by changing our system of checking tax declarations of profits. We
still adhere to the principle that every personal declaration should
be checked, although we know that in fact only a few can be
checked. As a result, the risk of being checked is so low that wide-
spread evasion is encouraged. Second, the revisions which we make
must be sufficiently general to convince people that the new mea-
sure will not introduce a new kind of fiscal discrimination against
somebody, or in favor of somebody else. In any general tax revision,
tax rates must be fixed at a reasonable level. In theory, the Italian
income tax is one of the most progressive; but in fact it is rather re-
gressive. It could be made more progressive if the government had
the means to reduce evasion and if it would make empirical anal-
yses of the effects of rate changes on total tax revenue. The latter is
particularly important if we are to answer those who object to radi-
cal changes in the tax laws on the grounds that we do not know
what their revenue effects are likely to be.
Let me now make a few comments on the way in which I think
our fiscal policy should be administered in order to foster economic
growth. 1 have in mind particularly the needs of countries where
there are regions that are depressed or underdeveloped. In these
countries, it is generally felt that the national government shouldItaly 205
establisha long-range program to provide the facilities needed for
economic development. This is required, first, because only in this
way will it be possible to gain the perspective needed for the de-
velopment of some sectors, and second because economic develop-
ment should be concentrated in certain sectors and in a few regions
in order to bring about the required take-off for the economy as a
whole. To implement the plan for economic development, the gov-
ernment must create the necessary amount of social capital at those
times and in those regions where it will serve the plan best. Fur-
thermore, in order to achieve effective utilization of resources and
at the same time avoid too much concentration of capitalist power,
there must be some integration of public and private enterprise.
The need for this is diminishing somewhat because Italy's partici-
pation in the Common Market has intensified the competition be-
tween large firms.
The question of whether it is advisable to foster investment by
tax exemption of profits can, in my opinion, hardly be settled in
general terms. Sometimes increases in consumption are needed,
sometimes increases in private investment, and sometimes increases
in public investment. Sometimes a certain amount of public invest-
ment may be required before private investment opportunities can
be exploited, as is the case in the South of Italy.
I agree with Forte about the desirability of a tax on value added
and a purchase tax only on the last transfer of the commodities.
Our present system of indirect taxes badly distorts the structure of
production. I think that indirect tax rates should be adjusted from
time to time in order to maintain the desired balance between pres-
ent and future consumption and in order to foster investment as
opposed to consumption as well as to foster public investment as
opposed to private investment. A tax on value added may make this
easier.
I come now to my final point. Perhaps I am more pessimistic
than my friend about the usefulness of tax exemption as a means of
fostering economic development in some special sector or some par-
ticular region. But I believe that when you start such a policy, it
tends to become generalized and, therefore, inefficient. To the rea-
Sons for this pointed out by Forte, I would like to add a few more.20(3 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
First, a system of fiscal exemptions creates confusion in the minds
of the people and fosters a general feeling that fiscal policy is de-
signed to discriminate against some interests and favor others.
Second, a subsidy could be more easily directed than a tax ex-
emption toward those activities, sectors, or regions where it would
contribute most to economic progress. The present system of giving
tax exemptions for investment in certain regions has a twofold neg-
ative effect on the allocation of resources. It does not result in
enough public or private investment to permit the maximizing of
internal economies in the favored areas and it discriminates against
other regions by encouraging mere shifts of activities.
Third, the administration of subsidies is much more flexible than
that of tax exemption. Subsidies can be designed so as to affect the
initial cost of setting up or of enlarging an activity.
Finally, a subsidy policy can be more easily coordinated with
other policies, such as the investment policies of firms controlled by
the government, and the formation of social capital by the national
or local governments. I believe that it is only by coordinating these
different kinds of subventions that an effective program for the eco-
nomic development of underdeveloped regions can be worked out.